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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ON AGRICULTURE IN 
POST- CONFLICT COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL 
THE CASE OF KOSOVO 
 
GÜZİN AYCAN ÖZTÜRK 
MA Thesis, June 2017 
 
THESIS SUPERVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. MEHMET EMRE HATİPOĞLU 
 
The thesis departs from the idea that there is not enough academic research on the 
relationship among sectors constituting the whole peacebuilding/ statebuilding activities 
while most of academicians and practitioners value the comprehensive peacebuilding 
and post-conflict statebuilding to respond the challenges in post conflict context. As a 
starting attempt, the thesis focuses on the possible impacts of Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) on agriculture in post- conflict environment. The thesis takes Kosovo as a case 
and examines possible positive and negative impacts of SSR on agriculture based on the 
hypotheses considering the engagement of security forces in rural areas, labor shifts and 
resource distribution. The results based on the qualitative data indicate that positive 
impacts are more visible while negative ones are not totally proved due to lack of data 
as another impediment in post- conflict context. 
 
Keywords: Peacebuilding, Security Sector Reform, Agriculture, the Case of 
Kosovo, Empirical Appraisal 
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ÖZET 
 
UYUŞMAZLIK SONRASI ÜLKELERDE GÜVENLİK SEKTÖRÜ 
REFORMUNUN TARIMA ETKİSİ: AMPİRİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME 
KOSOVA ÖRNEĞİ 
 
GÜZİN AYCAN ÖZTÜRK 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2017 
 
TEZ DANIŞMANI: DOÇ. DR. MEHMET EMRE HATİPOĞLU 
 
Bu tez, mesleki meşguliyetlerinin ne olduğundan bağımsız, akademisyen ve 
pratisyenlerin çatışma sonrası bağlamındaki zorluklara cevap verecek kapsayıcı bir barış 
ve çatışma sonrası devlet inşasını önemserken, barış ve çatışma sonrası devlet inşası 
aktivitelerini oluşturan sektörler arası ilişki üzerinde yeterince akademik araştırma 
olmadığı fikrinden yola çıkmaktadır. Bir başlangıç girişimi olarak, bu tez, çatışma 
sonrası durumunda Güvenlik Sektörü Reformunun tarım üzerindeki etkilerine 
odaklanmaktadır. Bu tez, güvenlik güçlerinin kırsal alanlardaki angajmanı, iş göçü ve 
kaynak dağıtımını içeren hipotezlere dayalı olarak,  Güvenlik Sektörü Reformunun 
tarım üzerindeki muhtemel pozitif ve negatif etkilerini incelemek üzere Kosova’yı bir 
vaka olarak ele almaktadır. Nitel verilere dayanan sonuçlar, olumlu etkilerin daha fazla 
görünür olmasına karşın, negatif olanların, çatışma sonrası bağlamın başka bir engeli 
olarak veri eksikliği nedeniyle tamamen kanıtlanmadığını göstermektedir. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış İnşası, Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu, Tarım, 
Kosova Örneği, Ampirik Değerlendirme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
AKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 Throughout the thesis process, I re-realized how lucky I am. In the first place of 
this academic journey, I would like to thank to my thesis advisor, Mehmet Emre 
Hatipoğlu for his seminal comments and questions about every word of this thesis that 
enlightened my way in every deadlock I faced in this process. I also would like to thank 
to my distinguished jury members, İzak Atiyas and Emre Erşen for their valuable 
contribution, feedback and time they reserved for thesis. I am grateful to Mr. Recep 
Köşker, member of Turkish Embassy in Prishtina, for the time and effort he spent to 
arrange the meetings at the state departments for field research. 
  
 I owe many thanks to my dearest parents Gülseren and Davut Öztürk and my 
brother Sercan for their support and unconditional love they gave me throughout my 
life. I am also grateful to my dearest friend, Ersagun Kocabaş for his all intellectual and 
emotional support in every tough time I experienced during my MA studies.  
  
 I also highly value the contribution and feedback that my dear friends Medina 
Shahverdiyeva and Ayşe Büşra Topal provided me when I needed to share my ideas 
about this work. I am also grateful to all FASS students who are part of intellectual and 
academic environment at Sabancı University.  
 
 I thank to Sabancı University for giving me opportunity and scholarship for my 
M.A. studies.  Last, but not least, I deeply appreciate the financial support Mr. Hüseyin 
Mangan provided throughout my studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
   
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………..…..…………………….1 
 
CHAPTER 2. PEACEBUILDING……………………...….………………………....9 
2.1. Challenges in Post- Conflict……………………...……………..………….……..9 
  2.2. Peacebuilding…………………………………………………...………..……....12 
  2.3. Legitimacy in Peacebuilding………….……………………………...….……….15 
2.4. Hybrid Peace………………………………………………………….………….18 
2.5. Peacebuilding and Post- Conflict Statebuilding………………………………….19 
 
CHAPTER 3. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND AGRICULTURE IN POST- 
CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING……………………………….................................21 
3.1. Security Sector Reform in Post- Conflict………………………………………..21 
3.2. Security Sector Reform and Agriculture in Post- Conflict……………………....24 
 
CHAPTER 4. RESERCH METHOD…………………………………….………...40 
4.1. Research Question……………………………………………….………….……40 
4.2. Descriptive and Qualitative Method…………………………………….……….40 
4.3. The Case of Kosovo……………………………………………………………...41 
4.3.1. Background of the Kosovo Conflict…………………………………….……..41 
4.3.2. International Presence in Kosovo…………………………....………….……..43 
4.3.3. Security Sector Reform in Kosovo……………………………………….……45 
4.3.4. Economic Outlook and Agriculture in Kosovo………...………..……...……..48 
4.4. Data Collection……………………………………………...…..……………….53 
4.5. Qualitative Data and Hypotheses Analysis............................................................58 
 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS…………………………………….…62 
 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………….……………...64 
APPENDICES…………………………………………………….…………………74 
APPENDIX. A. Interview Questions  
APPENDIX B. Approval Form of Sabancı University Research Ethics Council       
(SUREC) 
APPENDIX C. Consent Form 
 
 viii 
List of Tables and Graphs 
 
Graph 1: Albania, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Graph 2: Benin, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Graph 3: Bosnia Herzegovina, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current 
Prices. 
Graph 4: Central African Republic, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current 
Prices. 
Graph 5: Cote d’Ivoire, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Graph 6: Guineau, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Graph 7: Kosovo, Export and Import Value Prices. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Graph 8: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Benin.  
Graph 9: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Burundi.  
Graph 10: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Central African Republic 
Graph 11: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Democratic Republic of 
Congo  
Graph 12: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Guineau Bissau. 
Graph 13: Rural and Urban Population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Graph 14:  Rural and Urban Population in Benin. 
Graph 15: Rural and Urban Population in Burundi. 
Graph 16: Rural and Urban Population in Central African Republic 
Graph 17: Rural and Urban Population in Cote d’Ivoire 
Graph 18: Rural and Urban Population in Democratic Republic of Congo 
Graph 19: Rural and Urban Population in Guinea 
Graph 20: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Afghanistan 
Graph 21: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Benin. 
Graph 22: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Bosnia Herzegovina 
Graph 23: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Burundi. 
Graph 24: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Central African Republic. 
Graph 25: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Graph 26: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Mali 
Graph 27: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Graph 28: GDP per capita in Kosovo. 
 ix 
Graph 29: Net ODA Received in Kosovo. 
Graph 30: Balance of Payments in Kosovo. 
Table 1: Consumer trends in Kosovo. 
Table 2: Farm Structure by Size and Number of Agricultural Households in 2014. 
Table 3: Food Industry and Agro business for 2011- 2015. 
Graph 31: Export- Import in Agricultural Products, in 1000 Euros in Kosovo. 
Graph 32: Employment and Unemployment Rate in Kosovo. 
Graph 33:  People Employed in Agriculture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
List of Symbols and Abbreviations 
 
BONUCA: United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic 
CEMAC: The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
CSDP: the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy 
DFID: Department for International Development 
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo 
EU: the European Union 
EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
EURSR: European Union Special Representative  
FAO: the Food and Agriculture Organization 
FOMUC: Multinational Force in Central Africa 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GIZ: German International Cooperation Agency 
GNI: Gross National Income 
IFOR: Implementation Force 
IMF: the International Monetary Fund. 
IO: International Organization 
KAS: Kosovo Agency of Statistics. 
KFOR: the Kosovo Force 
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army 
KPC: the Kosovo Protection Corps 
KPC: the Kosovo Police Service 
IPTF: International Police Task Force 
MISAB: Inter- African Mission for Accord Surveillance 
MINURCA: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic 
MINURCAT: Mission of the UN in Central African Republic and Chad 
MISAB: Inter- African Mission for Accord Surveillance 
NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO: Non-governmental Organization 
OAU: Organization of African Union 
ODA: Official Development Aid 
OSCE: Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 xi 
OECD DAC: Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe Development 
Assistance Committee 
PKSOI: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 
SFOR: Stabilization Force 
SSDAT: Security Sector Development Advisory Team 
SSR: Security Sector Reform  
TİKA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
UK: the United Kingdom 
UN: the United Nations  
UNDP: the United Nations Development Program 
UNDPO: The United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations. 
UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
UNMIK: the United Nations Mission in Interim Government in Kosovo 
UNMOT: the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan  
UNPROFOR: the United Nations Protection Force 
UNSG: The United Nations Secretary General 
UNTOP: The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding  
USAID: the United States Agency for International Development 
USIP: United States Institute of Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Post- conflict has been widely used as a concept following the end of the Cold- 
War in order to refer to the period following the ‘‘cessation of conflict’’ (Gagnon and 
Brown, 2014). The concept was first mentioned in the report of ‘‘Agenda of Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’’ authored by the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros- Boutros Ghali in 1992, following the January 1992 UN 
Security Council Summit Meeting. According to Hozic, (2014) the Agenda asserted 
three features for ‘‘post- conflict.’’ First, it preferred the word of ‘‘conflict’’ rather than 
‘‘war’’ in a manner that would cover material and immaterial issues and clashes; 
second, it focused on creation and empowering liberal institutions; and lastly it 
provisioned the obstacles that ‘‘post- conflict’’ poses to the grand aspirations of the 
Agenda (Gagnon and Brown, 2014, p.24). Since then, post-conflict societies continue to 
attract attention, scholarly and policy-wise (Paris 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Le 
Billon, 2008; Bell and Evans, 2010; Chandler, 2010; MacGinty, 2011; Roberts, 2011; 
Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; IPI 2012; Gagnon and Brown, 2014; Heleta 2016;). For 
instance, resolving issues in post-conflict Bosnia in administrative and legal issues or 
post-conflict Burundi proved to be quite challenging for locals and internationals.   
A number of challenges exist in post-conflict reconstruction: societal, political, 
historical, legal among others. Economics also form an important challenge to recover 
the whole economy after a total destruction with another basic need of human beings 
such as safety and security (Maslow, 1954). And as a result, post-conflict plans in 
general and Security Sector reform in particular have started looking at the satisfaction 
of basic needs of humanity. 
Economics by itself is also a huge concept that includes foreign aid, income, growth, 
production, trade, agriculture and so on (Hoeffler, Ijaz and con Billerbeck, 2010). The 
usage of foreign aid delivered by the international organizations and by other states and 
how to recover the totally destructed economy are amongst the most debated issues in 
post- conflict economies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2002; 
Minoiu and Reddy, 2009). Many of the acute interventions, however, proved to be 
insufficient to sustain peace as the relapsing cases of post-conflict violence in 
Afghanistan, Timor Leste (Call 2008), Central African Republic and Tajikistan have 
shown. These pitfalls in interventions have also been reported by the representatives of 
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intervening institutions. Former United Nations Under-Secretary General Jacques-Paul 
Klein (2004) claimed that post-conflict peacebuilding activities are negatively sloped in 
terms of their results considering the success of peacebuilding interventions by the 
international organizations. These series of failures deriving from uncertain atmosphere 
in post- conflict setting composed of asymmetric power relations; unprecedented 
consequences stemming from imposition of a new political, economic, social system by 
international organizations and varying levels of resistance by the locals to 
peacebuilding agendas in intervened cases, in turn, raised the prospects of peace-
building necessitated a deeper and nuanced engagement by the international 
organizations.  
However, few have looked at specific outputs in the policy sector and the 
interaction among different policy sectors. This is important not only because that a 
functioning economy, rebuilding mutual trust in the society, strengthening the 
institution and even creating new ones are vital, but also important for a cohesive polity 
in a country that all the aspects are being rebuilt after a destruction. For instance, water 
management has been a persistent issue in Kosovo's Drini basin, a region composed of 
mostly Albanians and of a smaller group of Serbians. The management company of this 
water basin, Gelsenwasser, had facilitative relations with Albanians while suffering 
from relatively vulnerable relations with the Serbian community. Intermingling with 
enclaves for water supply and usage, this issue turned to rejection of paying the bills by 
the Serbs, as the water is supplied from Radiniqi Lake situated in an Albanian- 
dominated region. The company, as a response, sent the bills in different languages to 
persuade the Serbians that the issue is not something political. However, enclaves 
insisted to refuse the payment. As a result, the company had to explain to the Albanians 
that they had to pay the bills while Serbs do not. Furthermore, the company faced 
financial restrictions, as well. Finally, the pipe lines were destroyed several times by 
Serbian enclaves and the water management system failed (Krampe, 2016).  Thus, this 
technical approach in water management without considering conflictual past among 
the communities and lack of political strategy showed that local realities be 
acknowledged in a reform and management attempt in post- conflict context.  
Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the attempts to address such multi-faceted 
challenges in post-conflict societies. SSR, as a second generation of peacebuilding 
activity among other pillars of reconstruction such as justice and economic system, 
seeks to build and/or strengthen institutions responsible for security such as defense and 
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police forces, intelligence with respect for human rights and rule of law (UNSG Report, 
2008). SSR is also related with judiciary and parliamentary reforms due to the emphasis 
on the importance of rule of law and civilian oversight in order to achieve democratic, 
transparent and a just system (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012). Just as water management 
and security sector reform, agriculture constitutes another important area for sustainable 
peace and development. Because agriculture is considered as the most suitable source 
for survival in a short-term. In relation to responsiveness to short term needs, 
agriculture is a main driver for economic development especially in post- conflict 
countries (USAID, 2009); most internal conflicts take place in less-developed countries 
(Collier et al, 2003), and agriculture tends to make-up larger shares of employment in 
such less developed countries (Birner, Cohen and Ilukor, 2011). Accordingly, the share 
of agriculture stimulates the importance of the sector as a main contributor in GDP in 
these countries (FAO, 2012). Additionally, the most of post- conflict countries are rural 
ones and the sector can endure disarmed combatants (USIP and PKSOI 2009).   
 After a separate revision of two salient sectors in post- conflict recovery, when 
the general trend in security sector reform and agricultural reconstruction by 
international organizations is skimmed, one can see the similarities in the aims and the 
way they how international organizations approach to post- conflict reconstruction 
agendas in agricultural and security sector. Meaning, for both sectors, the IOs, mainly 
the UN and its related branches, aim to build capacity and to make the actions 
community driven; perceive the processes as a technical issue; put sustainability of the 
reforms as a priority (UNDPO SSR Unit, 2012). Despite the salience and similarities in 
the approaches of security and agricultural sectors in post-conflict societies for a 
sustainable peace, few have looked at the relation between the two. This study aims to 
fill this gap. More specifically, this study identifies an interesting trend among many 
countries that have undergone SSR: regardless of the country’s acute conflict history 
before SSR, (i) the agricultural output remains stagnant, and (ii) the gap between 
agricultural imports and exports in US dollar current prices significantly increases 
(Please see Graphs 1 to 7).  This situation, thus, needs to be investigated.  
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Graph 1: Albania, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product. US Dollar, 
Current Prices.  
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
 
 
Graph 2: Benin, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product. US Dollar, 
Current Prices.  
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
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Graph 3: Bosnia Herzegovina, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. 
US Dollar, Current Prices.  
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
 
 
Graph 4: Central African Republic, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural 
Product.. US Dollar, Current Prices. 
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
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Graph 5: Cote d’Ivoire, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US 
Dollar, Current Prices. 
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
 
 
 
Graph 6: Guineau, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, 
Current Prices. 
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
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Graph 7: Kosovo, Export and Import Value Prices in Agricultural Product.. US Dollar, 
Current Prices. 
Source: World Trade Organization Data 
 
 
To problematize this empirical evidence considering the increasing gap between 
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As such this thesis will specifically look at the impact of resource distribution 
(government budget and foreign aid) between security sector and agriculture; the impact 
of engagement of security forces in rural areas on agriculture and how security sector 
reform can have an impact on rural- urban shifts in post conflict context. In addition to 
the difficulty to the measure the impact of SSR on agriculture, this study does not aim 
to build a causal relationship but rather seeks to grasp the mechanism in the empirical 
data revealed in graphs above.  
 
This study conducts research on the relationship between Security Sector 
Reform and agriculture in the context of Kosovo. The results indicate that in Kosovo, 
SSR can have an indirect positive impact on agriculture especially when demining and 
the engagement of security forces in rural area is the case. However, indirect negative 
impacts, examining labor shift towards urban areas and competition between these 
sectors for resource distribution could not be proven due to lack of data about labor 
distribution in security and agriculture. However, all the qualitative data collected 
prevails the reality that existing dialogue between security and agriculture sector is not 
enough to enhance comprehensive peacebuilding aimed across a variety of sectors and 
although the participants agree their individual importance for a peaceful society 
especially in post- conflict context. 
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CHAPTER 2. PEACEBUILDING IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 
 
2.1. Challenges in Post- Conflict Polities 
 
Post- conflict reconstruction has occupied a major place and taken scholarly 
attention in conflict resolution and peace and conflict research. This is not only due to 
the aim to realize a stable peace in a society recovering from conflict, but also due to the 
challenges stemming from the remnants of conflicts. These obstacles to reconstruction 
can be grouped as the ones that are psychological, economic, political and security in 
post- conflict environment.   
Steenkamp (2011) argues that peace does not bring physical security. Rather, 
even at the presence of a negotiated settlement, insecurities and barriers to effective 
resolution remain, if not get worse in a post-conflict environment. The transition from 
acute to post-conflict management poses a number of challenges due to new 
contestations in various realms of life. In the socio-political realm, Lederach (1998) 
points out geographical proximity of the conflicting parties and sticking on and transfer 
of violent trauma associated with perceived enemies to next generations, he also 
highlights the importance of real life experiences in post-conflict context. The past 
continues to haunt and it presents a problem of commitment and increases suspicion 
over the motivations of the other sides and of external actors, as well. Similarly, Berdal 
(2009: 44-45) asserts that the past can reflect on post-conflict societies by the 
exacerbating rhetoric and policies of subjugation, conflict and glory. Such rhetoric, as 
others have found, are very difficult to eradicate since they serve as opportunities for 
mobilization by exploiting politicians. Similar to Lederach (1998) and Berdal (2009) in 
valuing the shadow of conflictual past in post- conflict, Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoglu 
(2015) also underline importance of the emotional remnants of conflictual relations. On 
the psycho-social dimension, Volkan (2004) coins the concept of ‘chosen trauma’ for 
building the identity on a past victory or a loose and consolidating, transferring trauma 
based identity from generation to generation as a defense and linkage mechanism in a 
group. Chosen trauma, furthermore, can be activated by propaganda and turn to a 
violent act as a defense mechanism to protect the ‘self.’ Relating to historical 
experiences in sociological realm, this sense of vulnerability and conflictual past 
augments expectations in an unrealistic manner that makes harder to satisfy the needs of 
parties (Berdal, 2009: 45-46).    
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These barriers mentioned above poses some problems for future relations of 
previously conflicting parties. From a conflict resolution perspective, for instance, 
getting at the table and opening the new issues between the parties become harder 
(Ghosn, 2010). Since post-conflict horizon is significantly longer than that in acute 
conflict, Zenelaj et al (2015) also argue that giving concessions to the other party 
becomes costlier over time: a legal favor today, some parties perceive, may lead to their 
assimilation decades later on. The problems are no longer ‘ripe’ (Zartman, 2003) for 
resolution in a post-conflict setting, which in turn, make ‘‘parties to dig in their heels, 
with the understanding that small political gains during the formation of these 
institutions can translate into substantial positional advantages in the future.’’ (Zenelaj 
et al, 2015: 431) 
The pressure to stop immediate conflict can saw the seeds of other intractable 
conflicts in the longer term. Peace agreements mostly aim to stop blood (Krause and 
Jütersonke, 2005), and therefore may not be comprehensive, and leave certain points for 
later deliberation. Such points that have not been finalized can later transform into 
political impasses, which, in turn, can increase the likelihood of ethnic security 
dilemmas to be used by the parties (Manning, 2004). Conflict recurrence, therefore, 
poses another risk in post conflict environment if long- term dynamics are not 
considered in post- conflict reconstruction agendas. According to Walter (2015: 1242), 
90 per cent of civil wars happened by 2000 have repeated themselves. The prevalence 
of such recurrence may be due to several reasons. By introducing the concept of conflict 
trap, Collier and Sambanis (2012) argue that once a country falls into a civil war, that 
country is trapped in a cycle that produces social, political and economic context that 
can reproduce a civil war. By examining military expenditures, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2006), find that military expenditures increase during civil war and military equipment 
is mostly imported. Moreover, these expenditures continue substantially even if the civil 
war ends as civil war risks continue. In post-conflict countries the risk persists due to 
the higher level of expenditures and continuous unfairness in society although they are 
more advance than their rates in times of conflict regarding the level of growth, income 
and they receive more aid in post- conflict phase (Hoeffler et al, 2010). Quinn, Mason 
and Gurses (2007), focus on the decisions of ex-combatants to reinitiate war into 
consideration based on structural conditions regarding the end result of conflict that 
indicates whether it was a victory for any party of a negotiated settlement. Quinn, 
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Mason and Gurses (2007) value post-war economic development after any kind of 
conflict to prevent recurrence.   
Violence in conflict can also resurface as ‘crime’ in a post- conflict polity. 
DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) find that the cost of power sharing itself can 
affect the duration of peace agreements and reoccurrence. For them, low cost power 
sharing for the governments agreements affirming previous agreements last longer than 
costlier power sharing agreements because the government can control the situation and 
thus, less likely to initiate renegotiation. From an institutional perspective, Walter 
(2015) underlines the importance of accountability of political elites and participation of 
public into political affairs with a provision of checks and balances over power and 
providing a non-violent platform for political change. 
In addition to various obstacles mentioned above, post- conflict societies that 
have suffered from large-scale violence generally lack necessary capital for 
reconstruction and strong institutions in a post-conflict setting (Themnér and Utas, 
2016). Therefore, peace is fragile in post-conflict setting and requires to be sustained A 
number of institutional interventions, yet, have been designed to overcome and to 
transform security and consensus seeking challenges into a ‘peaceful’ manner. The 
innovations have been applied across a wide geography; for different types of civil war; 
by various  actors taking initiative, such as nation-states, regional or international 
organizations. For instance, United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 
(UNMOT) was established in 1992 to coordinate humanitarian assistance. Thanks to a 
shuttle diplomacy and cooperation with Russia, the UN paved the way for a political 
settlement between Tajik leader Rakhmonov and opposition leader Nuri in 1994. United 
Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) was founded to support the 
agreement, to empower post- conflict peace process with a broad agenda composed of 
economic recovery, mitigation of poverty, good governance, rule of law, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration program (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 37-38).   
Recurrence of conflict and interventions by various missions in Central African 
Republic (CAR exemplifies one of the innovations to overcome the obstacles in post- 
conflict. Following its independence in 1960, CAR established one-party system 
dominated by the strongman David Dacko. His tenure was also marked with numerous 
attempts of coup d’etat.  The 1996 coup attempt led to a full scale civil war which result 
in deployment of peacekeeping operation Mission Interafricaine de Surveilliance des 
Accord de Bangui/ Bangui Inter-African Mission for Accord Surveillance (MISAB) led 
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by Organization of African Union (OAU) with French financial support. Mission des 
Nations Unies en Républic Centrafricaine/ United Nations Mission in Central African 
Republic (MINURCA), a UN peace operation replaced MISAB between 1998-2000. 
Bureau politique d’observation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique / United Nations 
Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) took the place after 
2000 and it was followed by The Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC) sponsored by Force Multinationale en Centrafrique/ Multinational 
Force in Central Africa (FOMUC). In 2008, Mission des Nations Unies en République 
Centrafricaine et Tchad/ Mission of the UN in Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT) came to the scene with the mandate to stabilize the region, focusing on 
the borders and involved development based approaches by the World Bank (N’Diaye, 
2012).   
With the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on 11 October 1995, 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was on the ground until 20 December 
1995 in order to monitor the ceasefire and to support peace negotiations in Dayton. By 
the Resolution 1031/(1995), the Security Council endorsed the presence of a High 
Representative to ‘‘mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the 
activities of the civilian organizations and agencies" in civilian components of Peace 
Agreement. In addition to this broad agenda, the Resolution welcomed the NATO 
initiative, Implementation Force (IFOR), which would be succeeded by multinational 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) by the urge of the UN in 1996. By Resolution 1035 (1995), 
the Security Council decided to launch the United Nations International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). 
The civilian dimension of UNMIBH involved establishment of rule of law, reform and 
restructuring of the local police, strengthening of the judicial system and monitoring of 
all these activities. As these selected three interventions in different conflicts show, 
post-conflict international statebuilding and peacebuilding have become especially 
salient with their loaded agenda over a decade.   
 
2.2 Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding has gained increasing scholarly attention over the last two 
decades. Although the UN operations has held peace operations in some countries both 
during and at the early times of the end of the Cold War such as in Egypt, 1956, Belgian 
Congo and New Guinea in the beginning of 1960s (Paris, 2004), peacebuilding was first 
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formally defined by the former UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. In his Agenda of 
Peace he defined the objective of peacebuilding as to “[i]dentify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict” (Agenda for Peace 1992). Additionally, the need to increase   
  
“the sense of confidence, disarmament, repatriation of refugees, training and support 
for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, 
reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and 
informal processes of political participation” 
  
are mentioned as the issues for a consolidated peace in post-conflict peacebuilding. 
According to Sabaratnam (2011) this attempt to define peacebuilding was to revitalize 
and to re-assert the role of the UN in global politics as an ‘‘autonomous agent of 
peace."   
Following this first attempt to frame the concept and the actions by the UN, 
several international organizations and scholars have come up with various definitions. 
For Call (2008, p. 5), ‘‘peacebuilding is actions taken by international or national 
actors to consolidate or institutionalize peace.” Paris (2004) also agrees with this 
definition but he also underlines preventive actions in his peacebuilding 
conceptualization. Moreover, according to him, ‘‘democratization and marketization’’ 
has been a common theme among organizations engaged in peacebuilding (p. 19). 
Later, Paris (2008) draws attention the ‘institutionalization’ of peace in political, social 
and economic realms. He emphasizes the creation of institutions that would penetrate 
the society to transform the repertoire of action in a ‘peaceful’ manner. According to 
Doyle and Sambanis (2000), additionally, peacebuilding aims to strengthen the 
institutions that facilitate non-violent solutions for the conflicts that every plural society 
has.   
However, for Barnett et al (2007), local and international actors can vary in their 
aims and prioritizations. For instance, while finance-driven organizations such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) assign a high rank for post-conflict 
recovery and reconstruction; international organizations such as the European 
Commission, the UN Development Program prioritize conflict prevention.   
Barnett et all (2007) further clarify what differentiates conflict prevention from 
peacebuilding. Although both conflict prevention and peacebuilding aim to eliminate 
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the root causes of conflict by the similar techniques, for them, the ‘post- conflict’ aspect 
of peacebuilding is the defining factor as conflict prevention aims to eliminate the risks 
before conflict occurs (Barnett et al. 2007: 41-42). Accordingly, since conflicts are 
unique in terms of their root causes, every different peacebuilding action taken to 
overcome these root causes vary in peacebuilding targets.   
Barnett et al. (2007: 49) grouped these peacebuilding targets as ‘‘stability 
creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions 
of conflict..” The difference in targets and definition is also emphasized by Paris (2008). 
But this time, the difference between scholars and practitioners are highlighted. 
According to him, scholars mainly focused on ‘negative peace’, i.e. termination of 
armed conflict, while practitioners have a broader understanding in ‘positive’ kind of 
peace composed of various actions undertaken to provide a full-range of developments 
in human life.   
Similar to Barnett et al (2007) in the variance of priorities of local and 
international actors, Barnett and Zürcher (2009)  attempt to classify the peacebuilding 
game among peacebuilders, national and sub-national elites in post-conflict 
environment departing from the assumption that peacebuilding aims to solve root 
causes of conflict in a sustainable way which provide some qualities for life in post- 
conflict environment such as rule of law, a market economy free from corruption and 
culture of tolerance and respect. They establish a framework to explain why problems 
arise during implementation of peacebuilding programs, programs designed after a 
negotiated and accepted peace settlement and why only symbolic parts of the programs 
are more visible rather than internalization of the values proposed by peacebuilders. 
Barnett and Zürcher (2009) take these three group of actors as monolithic units for the 
sake of simplicity of the model. Therefore, they have stable definitions of interests for 
each actor, meaning, peacebuilders work for stability and liberalization; state elites seek 
to consolidate their power and subnational elites search for autonomy from the center in 
a world that has limited resources. They derive from the assumption that ability of an 
actor to reach its aims is based on the strategies of the other actors, they assert that 
environment cooperation is required by peacebuilders in order to achieve the program 
while state elites pose a skeptical approach towards their counterparts and the program 
in a peacebuilding. Based on these founding assumptions, they present four types of 
outcomes according to the interactions among these actors.  
 15 
Cooperative peacebuilding results in accepting and implementing the peace 
program in cooperation among all the actors. Secondly, compromised peacebuilding 
provides the platform for reflection and negotiation for demands of all sides. In 
captured peacebuilding, the program is implemented and resources are distributed by 
local and state elites as long as they are in accordance with their interests. Conflictive 
peacebuilding, lastly, poses possible use of force by any actor in order to realize their 
aims. Can you give any real life examples? 
Deriving from the conflict of priorities, the categorization examines the 
interactions between locals and internationals in the field and explains why a program is 
implemented or not. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) especially draw attention to the 
peacebuilding efforts in African countries by underlining the colonial history while they 
make the categorization operationalized in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in a broader 
context while the existence of Soviet Union is underlined. They mainly focus on 
willingness to share power between locals and internationals in political realm. 
However, we observe that statebuilding and peacebuilding programs are composed of 
varying sectors in the field that would provide instruments of governance such as 
security sector, rule of law and civil society and there is a need to go beyond transitional 
authorities and their relations with sub-national elites and international peacebuilders. 
Furthermore, they touch upon the differences in order for preferences of the actors 
among these types of outcomes for instance between stability or continuation of peace 
programs, however, we do not see any systematic explanation for these preferences and 
order. Although they underline the choices of international actors towards stability over 
the local issues in cases of Tajikistan, they do not fully explain what makes a 
peacebuilding action to fall under these categories.  
  
2.3. Legitimacy in Peacebuilding  
  
Legitimacy is another concept which occasionally becomes part of the 
discussion in peacebuilding (Bell and Evans, 2010). These peacebuilding interventions 
have been targeted by several critiques. The general tendency in these critiques can be 
summarized by the assumption of Lederach (1997: 94) that the best source of long term 
peace is embedded in local people and culture.  
Departing from the assumption that peacebuilding literature often focused on 
statebuilding and how to provide legitimacy for newly created or strengthened 
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institutions, Talentino (2007) delves into the question of how perceptions shape these 
activities approaching from first Western domination and imposition and secondly from 
broken promises perspectives. As well as previous scholars, for Roberts (2011) lack of 
legitimacy is the reason for why peace does not prevail as intended by international 
peacebuilding efforts. According to him, goals of peacebuilding do not match with the 
immediate needs of the people. Another problem he raises is that people are included 
only by the elections not by continuous and inclusive activities such as events that target 
the different segments of society. Thus, this periodic approach in peacebuilding based 
on elections decreases the level of dialogue. He also criticizes elite- oriented policies as 
they are not able to end corruption in post- conflict societies. According to him, liberal 
peacebuilding institutions can succeed only if they serve to the popular will before the 
needs of the elites.    
As a first kind of measuring the success of peacebuilding by quantitative 
analysis, by controlling local capacity in terms of peacebuilding success, Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000: 793) also find that economic development facilitates reconciliation 
even if level of hostility is high in an intervened country. They also find that identity 
wars as war types; deaths and displacement; number of factions in a war; natural 
resource dependence are negatively correlated with peacebuilding success while the 
power of the UN mandate and the UN involvement in the treaties for peacebuilding 
success. One surprising finding is that ethnic heterogeneity is not significant in 
peacebuilding success while some other scholars (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2000) find ethnic heterogeneity is important in continuation of 
conflicts.   Thus, economic development can contribute to the success of peacebuilding 
even if the post- conflict country has different ethnic groups.  
Williams and Mengistu (2015) scrutinize which bureaucratic changes are 
necessary in order to achieve ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding aims. They propose (i) a horizontal 
organizational structure to pave the way for a platform for exchange of ideas and 
collaborative relations instead of a ‘centralized command system’; (ii) creation of new 
databases about the resources devoted and used for operations by all stakeholders to 
reach a cross- check for the data prevailed by different actors that can contribute the 
resource allocation for each operation ; (iii) evaluation of actions that reveal the 
perceptions of targeted stakeholders an accountability and legitimacy bases.   
Bleiker (2012: 296), asserted that ‘‘Wherever peacebuilding takes place, there is 
resistance to it." He underlined that the colonial legacy of peacebuilders made the 
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acceptance of peace programs by the host communities and their implementation 
difficult. He also criticized these programs due to their aspect that liberal peacebuilding 
activities are state-centric and top down which do not consider local cultural values and 
everyday relations among the people that can penetrate into the society the 
peacebuilding operations are held.  
Whalan (2014: 8) furthers the legitimacy debate by addressing the concept of 
power in order to identify and understand processes through which a [peace] operation 
affects local actor behavior. Here, it should be stated that legitimacy is mostly searched 
for the legality of the operations in international arena, for instance the approval of the 
United Nations Security Council. However, in her framework, legitimacy is scrutinized 
inside the country vis-a-vis the local actors, as Whalan focuses alike. Her framework 
can also be combined with Barnett and Zürcher (2009).  currencies of power (coercion, 
inducement and legitimacy) can pave the way for consolidation of relations among 
international, national and sub-national groups proposed by Barnett and Zürcher (2009). 
Whalan (2015: 63) furthers the importance of legitimacy from just being a currency of 
power by asserting that legitimacy makes the exercise of power easier, less costly, more 
effective and more resilient. Because she takes power as relational departing from the 
work of Dahl (1957), in international relations literature, she presents a foundation to 
explain the relations between local and international actors in different sectors both 
underlying the hierarchical structure but also looking for sources (rules and norms, 
institutional credibility) and types of legitimacy (substantive and procedural) in local 
actors. 
The exclusive focus on local elites in Barnett and Zürcher (2009), is weakened by the 
approaches of Björkdahl, Höglund, Millar, Lijn and Verkoren (2016). They assume that 
sometimes it is the international side which comply, adopt, adapt, co-opt, resist or reject 
the applications (Björkdahl et al, 2016: 6). For instance, international actors can lack 
legitimacy in the eyes of locals if they propose an agenda based on only ‘dividing the 
cake’ but not on local needs. On the other hand, local actors who are active in 
statebuilding can also lack legitimacy in the eyes of internationals if they are corrupt (de 
Guevara 2008). However, corruption itself is also a debatable issue in times of 
peacebuilding. For instance, Le Billon (2008) asserts that although the legacy of such an 
approach is risky, sometimes corruption can foster security and stability in 
peacebuilding by its network of presenting resources to certain groups, especially if the 
risk of conflict of recurrence is high.  
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2.4. Hybrid Peace  
  
The critiques of top- down approaches to peacebuilding paved the way for arise 
of the concept of ‘hybrid’ peace was proposed by others to harmonize peacebuilding 
actions between local and international actors. By pointing to the failure of liberal 
peacekeeping operations to provide peace as they have pursued a ‘one-type-fits-all’ 
model so far, Mac Ginty (2008), values indigenous ways as they can correct the failures 
of liberal peace. Relatedly, Richmond (2010: 26) defines hybrid peacebuilding as ‘‘an 
emancipatory form of peace that reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, 
state and non-state, and aims at the creation of a discursive framework of mutual 
accommodation and social justice which recognizes difference.’’    
Hybridity, according to Mac Ginty (2011: 209- 225), is a result of four elements: 
first, the coercive power of liberal peace; second, the incentivizing power of the liberal 
peace; third, the ability of local communities to resist, negotiate with and subvert the 
liberal peace and fourth, the ability of local communities to create and maintain 
alternatives to the liberal peace. Thus, this combination of hybridizing the local and 
international approaches is useful to delve into the interaction between internal and 
external actors in internationally sponsored statebuilding (i) to move beyond liberal 
understanding, (ii) to overcome traditional binaries doomed as local and international, 
(iii) to look inside these categories, (iv) to capture the complexity and fluidity. The 
combination of local and international, in turn, led to the question of which actors are 
uniquely local and to what extent these actors possess agency and autonomy. (Mac 
Ginty, 2008; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012). For Richmond (2010: 669), ‘local’ is 
characterized by ‘‘context, custom, tradition and difference in everyday setting.’’  
Sabaratnam (2013), different from others, suggests that critiques to liberal 
peacebuilding should look in deeper and systematically at the nature of liberal peace 
which relies on Eurocentric point of view which stands for a belief in Western 
distinctiveness (2013: 267). According to her, intellectual dichotomy links liberal peace 
with ‘the West’ and the local with ‘non- Western’ by underlining cultural differences.   
 
The formal and informal network amongst local and international actors also 
affect the implementation and success of peacebuilding missions. These networks have 
generally been examined from the perspective of political economy in peacebuilding by 
scrutinizing local economic relations in everyday life as a way of continuation of power 
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relations of ex-combatants over the ordinary people (Themner and Utas, 2016). Kostic 
(2012, 2014, 2017) instead looks at the role of international networks in of NGOs in 
‘‘knowledge production’’ in a post- conflict setting. Kostic (2014: 634), asserts that 
especially in times of peacebuilding, which he defines as ‘‘battlefields of ideas where 
key international policy makers engage in internal battles for control over intervention 
policy’’, international think- tank organizations, act like agencies of international 
interveners to legitimize the positions of international actors.  
  
2.5. Peacebuilding and Post- Conflict Statebuilding   
  
Parallel to the emergence of peacebuilding, with the end of the Cold War, ‘state-
building’, with the aim to create and enhance good governance, became a salient topic 
in the post-conflict agenda (Chandler, 2010, ). Chandler (2010: 65- 66) characterizes 
international statebuilding paradigm with the notion of ‘post- liberal governance.’ This 
notion has two parts. The first is the shift from the autonomy and sovereignty that 
describes liberal state. The prefix of ‘post’, second, reveals the shift from the concept of 
government to governance that is no longer about which actors have the role in the 
system but rather how the ‘‘order is regulated and managed.’’  
  
The lack of control over territories seen as main causes of internal conflict 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) and of the main threats for international peace and security 
(Chandler 2010), as  weak states are not able to ‘‘penetrate society, regulate social 
relationship, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways’’ 
(Migdal, 1988: 4). As an international phenomenon, decolonialization, starting from 
1960s, led to the creation of states which are built on colonial legacy and supported by 
external states. These newly independent states could not develop infrastructures and 
institutions as a result of lack of their own capability. These kind of states are named as 
‘quasi- states’ by Jackson (1990). As a related concept to capacity control over territory 
and provide infrastructure, state failure appears in the statebuilding debate. A failed 
state is composed of warring parties, completely lacks authority and legitimate power 
within its territories. strengthening state has been proposed as the solution to recover 
and also to prevent conflicts.  
The role of state in development was revealed in the Washington Consensus 
(Newman and DeRouen, Jr, 2014). This role is also related with the preventive nature of 
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statebuilding and the intersection with peacebuilding that aims to eliminate the root 
causes of conflict with a sustainable, multi- dimensional peacebuilding agenda that 
generally combines governance, economic development and security.    
According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 780), state authority is crucial for 
sustainable peace, thus, statebuilding is a critical component of peacebuilding. This idea 
echoes in the assumption of Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 23), who state ‘‘[n]o 
international police or army can substitute for a combination of well- ordered markets 
and states.’’ They also underline the importance of statebuilding as solution for all 
security and development problems globally.   
De Guevara (2008: 348- 349) posits that statebuilding is dependent on the 
statebuilder’s ‘‘own social logics’’ and ‘‘incapacity of statebuilding practices’’ rather 
than their interactions with local actors. According to her, international statebuilding 
results in creation of dependent institutions in host countries to international actors 
while these kind of interventions aim to create ‘governance states’. As governance 
states are created by external actors rather than internal/ local contestation, she asserts 
that this ‘synthetic structure’ leads to external and internal lack of legitimacy for 
sustainable functions of the newly created states. Egnell and Halden (2013: 5-6), in 
relation to the creation of ‘new’ state apparatus, argues that statebuilders mainly 
approach statebuilding from Weberian understanding underlying monopoly over the use 
of violence. They build their argument on the new agendas in statebuilding which is 
composed of hybrid statebuilding, as in the critiques of liberal peacebuilding and 
endogeneity. Following their theoretical standing, they assert that this approach is not 
able to capture the reality as international statebuilding because (i) Weberian state 
theory in essence aimed to explain Western state formation in previous century, (ii) 
monopoly over use of violence is not appropriate enough to explain current post- 
conflict states, (iii) the approach cannot explain the complexity of the social context on 
which today’s state is built, (iv) Weberian approach tells us about a completed process 
while today’s statebuilding transforms by ongoing process.   
For the presence of international organizations and the strategies have been used 
by them, Bieber (2011), instead, takes EU conditionality vis-à-vis Balkan countries and 
he assumes that conditionality policy has been ineffective due to the lack of 
commitment of political elites to the EU integration in the cases of Serbia, Montenegro 
and Kosovo.   
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CHAPTER 3. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND AGRICULTURE IN 
POST- CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 
 
3.1. Security Sector Reform in Post- Conflict 
 
The very first aim of cessation of violent conflict and to provide basic secure 
environment by the international interventions show that ‘‘[a]mong the primary 
conditions for starting a process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of 
political institutions, security, and economic structures is a secure environment”  
(Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Therefore, interveners work for the institutionalization 
of security  in order to contribute post- conflict peacebuilding activities in post- conflict 
setting (Ingerstad, 2012). This attempt is named as Security Sector Reform and is 
categorized in second generation of peacekeeping operations which aims to prevent the 
future conflicts by delivering betterment of life in intervened conflicts rather than to 
‘freeze’ the conflict (Kenkel, 2013).  
 
SSR covers ‘all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the 
use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil 
structures that are responsible for their management and oversight’ (Chalmers, 2000: 
6). The concept of SSR, additionally, is not only about police and military branches but 
also about judiciary, governance and transparency as SSR is intertwined with rule of 
law, human security and development. Moreover, as an intervention-led concept in 
post-conflict countries; supported/ sponsored by foreign nation-states and supra-national 
organizations such as the United Nation (UN), the European Union (EU) and the 
Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP); SSR brings various actors at different levels. As a 
starting point, the initiatives of Department for International Development (DFID) of 
the United Kingdom starting from 1999 in Sierra Leone1 stands for the developing of 
SSR in post- conflict. Specifically, it becomes a priority for development- security 
nexus in the March 1999 speech of Clare Short, who was UK secretary of state for 
International Development back then (Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen in Sedra, 
2010). In this speech Short (1999) defined security sector as ‘‘the military, paramilitary 
                                                
1 Graphs regarding Sierra Leone are not present in the Introduction part due to the lack of data in World 
Trade Organization Statistics. 
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and intelligence services, as well as those civilian structures responsible for oversight 
and control of the security forces.’’ After that the UK played a proactive role in creation 
and initiation of an agenda through OECD Development Asisstance Committee (DAC)  
(Ball in Sedra, 2010).  
            OECD uses a broader definition on Security System and Governance Reform 
based on a larger set of actors, their roles and responsibilities. The broad actions, 
therefore, reveal the necessity to ‘‘[work] together to manage and operate the system in 
a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework’’. the OECD 
DAC Reference Document (2004: 16) identifies these actors and stakeholders as:  
 
• Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary  forces; 
presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); 
coastguards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense 
forces, national guards, militias).   
• Security management and oversight bodies: the executive; national security advisory 
bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal 
affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management 
bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil 
society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).  
 
• Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal 
investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and 
customary and traditional justice systems.   
• Non-statutory security forces with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; 
guerilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; and political party 
militias.  
 
As the DAC documents show, SSR is mostly concerned about strengthening newly 
created (or recently overhauled)  institutions, and capacity of human resources. 
Additionally, since SSR is a reform process that is about re-shaping the institutions by 
foreign and domestic actors, it is a completely political process. Since the reform 
process is about security institutions that are crucial for state authority, any change can 
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have a political impact (Barnabeu, 2007). According to Sahin (2016: 2), emphasis on 
civilian oversight may either strengthen power and position of the civilian authorities 
and aligned interest groups; or may face with a resistance by the former armed groups if 
they see any threat to their power. For instance, in Liberia, although disarmed, the ex-
commanders of the civil war have turned into ‘Big Men’ of Liberian informal economy, 
mostly thanks to the networks and political economic legacy established during the 
times of armed conflict (Themner and Utas, 2016). 
In relation to different conceptualizations of SSR, the reform process also differ in 
the ways SSR is held.  In some cases, former warring parties are integrated into one 
security institution as in the case of Sierra Leone, which has been under SSR since 1999 
Lome Peace Accord. On the other hand, in some other countries, like Liberia, present 
security forces are dissolved and recreated again. According to Nilsson and Söderberg 
Kovacs (2013: 3) these two different choices in SSR contain advantages and drawbacks. 
Integration of ex-combatants, for example can be relatively more ‘‘speedy and cost-
effective’’ in short term, but may create the impression that the international and local 
actors participating in SSR ignore human rights violations in long term. In addition, this 
integration can pose a threat for ex-commanders as they become a member of a branch 
under government control, thus peace itself becomes riskier (DeRouen, Lea and 
Wallensteen, 2009).  As opposed to integration of ex-combatants into the existing 
security structure, recreating the institutions can necessitate more time and resources in 
a society that is under high security risk. Thus, international peacekeeping forces are 
mandatory to endure the reform process.  
 
Although the way SSR is conducted differs, Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs (2013) 
find that international funding provides the required financial sustainability and both 
ways- creating new security institutions or integrating ex-combatants into existing 
institutions- have significant pitfalls in civilian oversight. Similar to previous scholars, 
Stanley and Call (in Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008: 300- 301) compares other strategies in 
creation and sustaining security institutions. One of them is ‘military merger’, as in the 
case of Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique. The second type for SSR 
is ‘demilitarization and police reform’ which depicts demilitarization of armed groups 
to diminish the power of ex- combatants and gives the responsibility to civilian police to 
secure the society and institutional reforms as in the case of El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Namibia. Relatedly, Wilén (2016) finds that integration of former foes may be 
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functional but does not mean that there is a positive correlation if there is an 
undemocratic framework for the government and the army interactions.  
In addition to civilian oversight for the sake of good governance and 
democratization (Chappuis and Hänggi in Chandler, 2013), local ownership has been 
highly prioritized for the sake of implementation (Donais 2009; OECD 2007; 
Oosterveld and Galand 2012; Mobekk 2010). Because lack of support and acceptance 
may endanger the legitimacy of reforms and therefore, the actions initiated by the 
international actors may not be sustained as they supposed to be (Gordon, 2014). 
Additionally, if SSR related institutions do not respond the needs of local people, trust 
in these institutions and in the state will be restricted (Jaye 2006; UN 2013; Gordon, 
Sharma Forbes and Cave 2011). Sometimes the willingness of local governments to 
reform their security sector is low. Examining Central African Republic and Liberia, 
Mehler (2012: 51) asserts that financial capacity, structure of security forces, mainly the 
size of presidential guards, continuation of civil wars, lack of responsibility of elites 
toward the ordinary people can impede providing security services for ordinary people 
and this lack of service leads to diminishing level of legitimacy for the central 
government. Therefore, increase in antagonism between state-society relations can 
cause new conflicts and central government may become reluctant to commence and 
maintain a reform based on rule of law and under civilian oversight. Thus, turning into a 
‘top-down’ process due to lack of legitimacy imperils success of reform process.  
 
 
3.2. Security Sector Reform and Agriculture in Post- Conflict 
 
Security sector reform is entangled with development vision by the international 
organizations. This developmental vision of international organizations is based on two 
arguments. First, institutionalized and secure environment will boost foreign investment 
and production in a post-conflict country that would satisfy the needs of the population 
and this will contribute to the successful and sustainable peacebuilding (Barnett et al, 
2007). The relation with economic development constitutes an important part of modern 
SSR.  
The main components of economic development, relatedly, include increase in 
production and manufacturing, export and import rate, employment percentage, income 
level among others (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Agriculture also constitutes an 
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important part of economic development, especially in post-conflict societies. Several 
reasons underline this importance of agriculture in relation to peacebuilding/ 
statebuilding and to SSR as a component of peacebuilding / statebuilding in post- 
conflict context: 
 
1. Agriculture constitutes an important part of economy, especially for underdeveloped 
countries (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). These countries are ‘’with low, stagnant, and 
unequally distributed per capita incomes that have remained dependent on primary 
commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict.’’ 
(Collier et al., 2003: 53) 
 
World Bank Data shows that the share of agriculture in GDP holds an important 
percentage in those countries affected by ‘prolonged conflict’ such as Benin, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau. The 
percentages in those countries are at least 20 percent, if not above 50 percent.  
 
 
Graph 8: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Benin.  
Source: World Bank Data. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Year
Benin
Percentage	of	Value	Added	Agriculture	in	GDP
 26 
 
Graph 8: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Burundi.  
Source: World Bank Data. 
 
 
Graph 9: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Central African Republic 
Source: World Bank Data. 
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Graph 10: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Democratic Republic of 
Congo  
Source: World Bank Data. 
 
 
Graph 11: Percentage of Value Added Agriculture in GDP in Guineau Bissau. 
Source: World Bank Data. 
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experienced a civil war, society is relatively more prone to recreation of perceived 
grievances when people become greedy in an underdeveloped economy especially when 
unemployment rate is high, armed groups can recruit more people (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2014). In relation to employment and recruitment by the insurgencies as an impediment 
in post- conflict, according to the Synthesis Report of International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2010), agriculture is an important sector for job 
creation and a direct way to reach poor and the people in need in rural areas that  would 
ensure a sustainable economy and peacebuilding. Furthermore, it will provide resources 
upon which the state itself can also draw from – providing finance to the government. 
For instance, according to the Report (2010: 36- 17), focusing on economic 
development encouraged by job creation prevailed in agriculture, strengthen stability in 
peacebuilding activities in countries such as Burundi, Southern Sudan, Timor Leste and 
Sierra Leone.  
 
3.    A healthy agricultural center that would produce surplus will also kick-start the rest of 
the economy. Although Tsakok and Gardner (2007) find no statistically significant clue 
for the role of agriculture in total economic growth, Tiffin and Irz (2006) finds that 
agriculture stands for a causal indicator for economic development. Winters et all 
(2007) posits that agricultural surplus can augment productivity, innovation and 
investment. It can foster public spending in industrial activities. Or absent such 
planning, the focus of agriculture can also may slide to illicit drugs as happened in 
Afghanistan with opium production. This is visible in the last reports of the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime that opium cultivation increased at 10 % in 2015. The founding 
reasons according to the Afghan officers are that increasing insecurity along with lack 
of capability and equipment to control poopy farms. (Agence France- Press, 23 October 
2016).  Raspberries in Kosovo exemplifies how can a specific type of fruit can earn 
higher price in comparison with other fruits in a country suffering from high trade 
(import-export) deficit. Plus, raspberry production creates increasing total export value 
as of €680 in 2013 (Open Data Kosovo) that makes the Ministry of Agriculture to 
ameliorate the competitiveness of the product by cost sharing.  
 
4.  Civil conflict and its aftermath are usually marred with massive movement of people 
both domestically and externally. Such movement puts considerable pressure on the 
state apparatus as well as the neighboring countries (Ayoob, 1995). If the movement is 
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international, it can regionalize the conflict and can have a spill- over effect (Milner in 
Betts and Loescher, 2011). This spill-over can be in a way of internationalization of 
civil conflicts by the states in order to win over their insurgents beyond borders which 
can intensify the tensions with their neighbors. (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008). 
Or, direct and indirect violence during conflicts cause migration from conflict zones 
(Wood 1994). If return of displaced  people to the rural is the case in post- conflict, this 
rural return poses obvious obstacles in both institution building and services such as 
education, healthcare, employment. Moreover, the rural return can augment 
‘‘competition for arable land.’’ (Zaum in Betts and Loescher, 2011: 288). On the other 
hand, if migration from rural to urban is the case, then urban unemployment increases 
and rural output decreases (Stiglitz, 1974) if there is no dramatic change in 
technological equipment. A healthy agricultural sector, on the other hand, may 
ameliorate such migration problems, by providing employment opportunities and 
distribution of population across land.  
 
In these two salient sectors in post- conflict that is related with the basic needs in 
Maslowian terms, some linkages can be constituted for the impact of SSR on agriculture 
in post- conflict societies. These linkages also constitute the arguments of this study and 
will be tested in the case of Kosovo.  
 
1. SSR can increase state capacity  (Gbla, 2006). This increase in the ability of the state to 
''design, implement, monitor and evaluate policy'’ (de Waal 2011: 130) can augment the 
control over territory which can make state to pursue agricultural development plans in 
an effective way (Delpeuch and Poulton, 2011).  
 
2. The more SSR provides secure environment in rural areas, the more people can engage 
in agricultural product This relation was exemplified in FARM project supported by the 
USA in South Sudan. In that case, the process continued by two ways: (i) As the mined 
areas were cleaned up, the lands became adequate for agricultural activities; (ii) people 
returned to their arable lands when SSR provided a secure environment for agricultural 
activity. Thus, agricultural sector developed by planted area and by the amount of 
product (FARM Project Report, 2012). 
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Indeed, figures below illustrate that the size and share of rural and urban population 
tend to increase in countries that underwent SSR in the aftermath of the Cold War. The 
figures list seven cases where SSR followed civil conflict, both of are illustrated with 
separate marks. An examination of these illustrate that the share of population living in 
rural areas increase, if not stay stable. This result also suggests that some of this 
population may have moved to urban centers in anticipation of pending conflict at the 
time, as civil wars paves the way for emigration at home or abroad that also turn to a 
chain migration (Collier et al, 2003). As such, effective management of this “rural 
shift” becomes of utmost importance in creating sustainable peace in post-conflict 
environments.    
 
Graphs from 12 to 18 below illustrate rural and urban population and the year of SSR.  
 
 
Graph 12: Rural and Urban Population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Source: FAO 
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Graph 13:  Rural and Urban Population in Benin. 
Source: FAO 
 
 
 
Graph 14: Rural and Urban Population in Burundi. 
Source: FAO 
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Graph 15: Rural and Urban Population in Central African Republic 
Source: FAO 
 
 
 
Graph 16: Rural and Urban Population in Cote d’Ivoire 
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Source: FAO 
 
 
 
Graph 17: Rural and Urban Population in Democratic Republic of Congo 
Source: FAO 
 
  
 
Graph 18: Rural and Urban Population in Guinea 
Source: FAO 
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The link between SSR and improvement in agricultural sector is, however, neither 
direct nor evident. The impact of SSR can be 'janus-faced'; SSR can lead to either to the 
improvement or deterioration of the agricultural sector in a post-conflict society. A 
number of factors turn out to be critical in defining the nature of the relationship 
between SSR and the health of agricultural sector.  It is also important to note that the 
direction of causation between these two salient sectors may run either way, or in a 
cyclical fashion.  
 
 
1. The political preferences of the government: A post-conflict government, which 
receives untied foreign aid, i.e. aid that the government can spend in any way it sees fit 
(Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2002), may decide to allocate resources to SSR at the 
expense of agricultural development. As a result, the agricultural sector can notably 
suffer, especially if the agricultural sector lacks capital-intensive equipment after a 
destructive conflict (Wanasundera, 2006). For instance, the Technical Report (2010: 67- 
68) of the Asian Development Bank indicated that the Bank aimed to revitalize 
agricultural sector by first strengthening infrastructure that the farmers need. In longer 
term, they guaranteed micro grants that will enhance engagement of people and prevail 
more job opportunities and economic development. 
 
2. Labor movement: A hypothetical resource distribution favoring SSR over the 
agricultural sector can also significantly affect labor movements in the society. For 
instance, improving the life and work conditions via SSR in the urban area, such as 
education programs and salary, may attract people from the rural side to the urban 
(Gbla, 2006). Such sustained migration can further destabilize the agrarian sector, hence 
jeopardizing post-conflict peace.  
 
3. Employment (or lack thereof) often becomes an important concern in a post-conflict 
economy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2003). SSR, in the short to medium term, creates 
notable employment in a post-conflict polity in urban centers through contracting. 
Furthermore, the business milieu / funding environment in urban setting created by 
SSR-related activities can lead to further employment opportunities (UNSG Reports on 
SSR, 2008; 2013). The projects held in Burundi, Guinea and Sierra Leone exemplified 
the job creation and especially youth and women employment that generally constitute 
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the higher greater rate in population. The SSR project in Guinea employed at least 2000 
young people and other provided necessary infrastructure and capacity building. (Fitz-
Gerald, 2012) Such a demand on the SSR side for employment can lead to further 
migration from rural to urban, putting more pressure on post-conflict cities.  
 
 
4. If locals and internationals have conflicts about SSR and if the economy of intervened 
country is heavily dependent on foreign aid; internationals can cut the foreign aid as a 
'stick' in order to have an impact on policies of locals as aid can redefine the repertoire 
of action of the locals (Wood and Sullivan, 2011). Thus, this decrease in the amount of 
aid can deteriorate other sectors of the recovery agenda in which agriculture is part of. 
From another perspective, SSR is internationally supported and/ or sponsored.  
The role foreign plays in the economies of post conflict societies with SSR is illustrated 
in Graphs 19 to 26. Foreign aid, in turn, can have a number of deleterious effects on the 
share of agriculture vis-à-vis industry in a country’s GDP (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 
2014). An inflow of “cheap SSR money” can lead to a speedy growth in the service 
sector, hence crowding out human resources and investment in agriculture (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011). This rural 'Dutch Disease', therefore, can deteriorate agriculture 
sector. Thus, when agricultural product decrease or the demand increases, the gap 
between export and import becomes sustained in the flow of ‘cheap money.’ 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
	o
f	G
NI
Year
Afghanistan
Net	ODA	Receieved	(%	of	GNI)
 36 
Graph 19: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Afghanistan 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
Graph 20: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Benin 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
Graph 21: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Bosnia Herzegovina 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Graph 22: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Burundi 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
Graph 23: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Central African Republic 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Graph 24: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Cote d’Ivoire 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
Graph 25: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in Mali 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Graph 26: Net ODA Received (% of GNI) in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 Therefore, the reflections of SSR on agriculture in providing more secure 
environment in rural areas, job opportunities and the place of SSR in resource 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1. Research Question 
 
The main research question of this thesis is ‘Whether and how Security Sector 
Reform impacts the agriculture sector in post-conflict countries?’ In order to investigate 
this impact, I formed 40 sub-questions scrutinizing 6 hypotheses above regarding state 
capacity, migration from rural to urban or vice-versa, governmental budget and foreign 
aid distribution for these two sectors.  
 
4.2. Descriptive and Qualitative Method 
  
Descriptive research method provides ‘‘a picture of the specific details of a 
situation, social setting or relationship’’ (Neumann, 2014, p.39), and is applied in this 
study to investigate the impact of Security Sector Reform on agricultural sector in post-
conflict countries. and resource distribution, urban- rural relations in terms of job 
creation and preferences underpin the theoretical framework. Since qualitative research 
focuses on interactive processes (Neumann, 2013, p. 17), and ‘‘seeks to unpack how 
people construct the world around them, what they are doing or what is happening to 
them in terms that are meaningful and that offer rich insight’’ (Kvale, 2008, p. 4); 
qualitative method stands an efficient way to study such an interrelated and multi-
disciplinary mechanism. For this research, deriving from empirical quantitative data 
revealed by international organizations, qualitative research makes possible to 
investigate the possible mechanisms in a specific case which is Kosovo. In addition, 
according to Yin (2002), case study is one of the best ways to understand a complex 
reality and to Walton (1992), ‘‘it demonstrate a mechanism about how social forces 
shape and produce results in particular setting.’’ .  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
4.3. The Case of Kosovo 
 
Declaring its independence in 2007 and being partly recognized by the international 
community, Kosovo is in a statebuilding/ peacebuilding phase. While the country has 
been heavily under international guidance for its main functions, many of the 
administrative duties, as in the words of the one of the interview participants, ‘‘from 
collecting the garbage to designing laws’’  has been transferred to the national 
authorities over the last 9 years since independence. Kosovo is an important case to 
study in a post-conflict context for several reasons. First, Kosovo has an armed 
conflictual past with Serbia starting before its independence declaration following the 
disintegration of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990s. Second, the country has a 
multi-ethnic and multi- religious population composed of Albanians, Bosniaks, Serbs, 
Turks, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Romani ethnic groups constituting Muslims, Catholic 
and Orthodox Christians and others. Early military intervention by NATO in 1999 and 
deployment of peacekeeping mission by the UN (UNMIK) in 1999 which was 
transformed EULEX in 2009 also mark the country’s brief history of independence. The 
Kosovo case is further important to be scrutinized because one of the regional 
international organizations, the EU also underlined as an important country for security 
vision under CSDP (Battiss, Luengo- Cabrera and Morillas, 2016). Plus, examining 
Kosovo as a case will contribute to the literature as the relation between SSR and 
agriculture has not attracted attention especially in Balkan countries although 
international organizations and scholars have been focused on these individual sectors 
in the Balkan Region.   
 
4.3.1. Background of the Kosovo Conflict  
 
The history of violent conflict in Kosovo has been dated back to ancient times 
similar to the other conflicts intermingled with historical, demographic and nationalistic 
arguments by the primary parties of the conflict. Main historical ‘milestones’ that 
produced historical ‘myths’ for the conflict are first, the ‘Battle of Kosovo’ that the 
Ottoman Empire won over the Serbian Kingdom in 1389; second is Serbian exodus 
from Kosovo from 1690s; third is Serbian ‘reconquista’ or ‘invasion’ of Kosovo in the 
eyes of Albanians in 1912 (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003: 31). For the contemporary 
conflict that started in 1998- 1999 and led to the independence, the Independent 
 42 
International Committee on Kosovo (2000: 32-35) finds the origins in nationalistic 
aspirations and the rise of Milosevic, who was the leader of Yugoslavia following Tito, 
the founder of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the Committee mentions the 
domination of Albanian population in Kosovo, they underline the importance of Kosovo 
‘as the heart of Medieval Serbia’. Such a primordial importance attested to Kosovo for 
the Serbs has increased the tension between Kosovars and Serbians. Milosevic, a 
populist-Serbian leader, was key to further instigating this conflict to mobilize his 
nationalist supporters in the –then- Yugoslavia during 1990s. 
Kosovo was an autonomous ‘constituent of Serbia’ in foundation of the People’s 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 despite the Albanian majority Kosovo 
territories. National armed forces during the Second World War (Weller, 2009: 28) that 
led to the creation of Yugoslavia left ‘ambiguous promise of self- determination’ for 
Kosovo province . According to Malcolm (2002: 314), Albanians in Kosovo were 
subjected to harshness in the first two decades of the Republic under socialist party of 
Tito due to the domination of Serbs and Montenegrins in the party. Although there were 
ongoing legal debates about and demonstrations for the status of Kosovo from the 
beginning (Malcolm 2002), several constitutional changes have been passed in 1960s 
that enhanced the legal status of Kosovo as a political entity(Weller, 2002: 28-29). In 
1966 constitutional change, in Amendment XVIII, Kosovo gained a legal entity with the 
potential that can pave the way for upgrading to a ‘Republic’ status in Yugoslavia 
(Malcolm, 2002: 324). Following the demonstrations adhered to the Prishtina 
University, Kosovo was defined as ‘autonomous province’ of Serbia instead of an 
‘autonomous region’ in 1974 Constitutional Amendment (Ker- Lindsay, 2009). By this 
change, Kosovo gained the equal status with Vojvodina, which was another province of 
Serbia and granted for this status in 1946 that was continuously debated considering the 
legal entities in the Republic.. Kosovo, now, could have its own constitution, assemble 
and seat on the federal council that were reserved rights for republics except the right of 
self- determination (Ker- Lindsay, 2009: 10). In this constitution, both autonomous 
regions were under the administration of Serbia and based on the principle of 1943 
constitution that only ‘nations’ can declare independence while ‘nationalities’ did not 
have such a right. Kosovo was considered as a ‘nationality’ in Serbia due to the 
‘Albanian’ Republic in the Federation (Malcolm, 1998).  
However, the stance in Kosovo was upon the independence in addition to ‘pro- 
Tirana’ slogans to be part of Albania while the Enver Hoxha regime in Albania was 
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suppressing all kind of religion. This suppression was also questioned by some other 
Kosovars that practice their religion in addition to cultural and linguistic differences 
between Kosovars and Albanians in that time. Plus, internal migration in Yugoslavia 
from underdeveloped to developed regions, increased the Albanian population in 
Kosovo as between 80,000 and 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo between 
1961- 1981 (Malcom, 1998: 328- 329).  
After the death of Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia, unhappiness with 
political and economic issues in Kosovo’ s status led to the riots starting at the 
University of Prishtina, later on, the protests was symbolized with the University, (Ker- 
Lindsay, 2009). Many of these protests were non-violent led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova 
who was the president of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologist and by Veton 
Surroi, the representative of Prishtina branch of the Union for a Yugoslav Democratic 
Initiative. These protests harshly responded by the Milosevic administration and 
increased the clashes between Kosovo Liberation Army (Malcolm, 1998) an armed 
group appeared in the beginning of 1990s (the Intependent International Committee on 
Kosovo, 2000). These clashes ended up with creation of new ‘hero and martyrs’ in in 
one of the clashes, Serbian forces killed Adem Jashari with his family and turned him 
into a ‘hero’ in the eyes of Albanians. The sanctions imposed on Milosevic by the 
Contact Group composed of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United 
States, on 9 March 1999 that blocked investments and restricted visa paved the way for 
more violent responses (Malcolm, 1998). From a conflict analysis perspective, these 
acts led to radicalization and dehumanization of the ‘other side’ that escalated the 
conflict in a higher speed (Pruitt, Rubin and Kim, 1994). Following these clashes and 
escalation, village militias by calling themselves as  Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
initiated the armed ‘defense’ mechanisms ‘‘This was the beginning of the war.’’. (the 
Independent International Committee on Kosovo, 2000: 55) 
 
4.3.2. International Presence in Kosovo 
 
International presence in Kosovo is comprised of the branches of the EU, 
NATO, OSCE and formerly, by the UN. The missions of these international 
organizations vary across from military intervention to capacity building. Some of the 
mandates for these missions start from the times of acute conflict to end the violence 
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while others have been solely active during post-conflict to endure the creation and 
establishment of institutions.  
The EU is currently present in Kosovo with the European Union Office in 
Kosovo/European Union Special Representative (EURSR), the EU Member State 
Representations (Embassies and Liaison Offices) and EULEX Mission, which became 
fully operational in 2009. The EU Joint Action of February 2008 and the Council 
Decision of June 2010 and June 2012 provide the legal basis for the Mission. EULEX 
works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The Mission 
supports Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area. 
The skills and expertise of EULEX are used to support the key EU aims in the visa 
liberalization process, the Feasibility Study and the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue. 
EULEX also supports the Structured Dialogue on the rule of law, led by Brussels. The 
Mission continues to concentrate on the fight against corruption and the mission works 
to enhance the the ties with local counterparts to achieve sustainability in Kosovo 
(About EULEX, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44).  Recently, the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo entered into force on 
01.04.2016 which composes the framework of relations between the EU and Western 
Balkan Countries and also is a step for membership such as screening and monitoring 
reports. 
 The NATO’ s military presence in Kosovo started with the air bombings in 
Kosovo on 13 October 1998 with authorization of the NATO Council after armed 
conflict between Serbia and Kosovo in 1998. However, before that, North Atlantic 
Council marked NATO’s objectives in Kosovo as facilitation for a peaceful resolution 
of the crisis and promotion of stability and security in neighbors especially in ex-
Yugoslavian countries on 28 May 1998. Until this decision, as Kosovo- Serbia conflict 
was long lasting since 1990s the NATO encouraged the Contact Group efforts and 
Rambouillet Meetings to reach a peaceful resolution. Following the seventy-seven days 
of air campaign, the strikes were temporarily suspended based on consultation of the 
North Atlantic Council and by General Clark who was in charge of Kosovo. After the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution, which paved the way for withdrawal of 
military, police and paramilitary forces of Federal Republic’s (Serbia), to 
demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army, and to deployment of international 
security presence, NATO started to deploy its KFOR in June with the aim of peace and 
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stability, border security, assistance for relocation and return for displace person and 
refugees in addition to assist Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Protection Corps.  
 
OSCE (Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe), as third big 
international organization in Kosovo, conducts a wide range of activities including 
support to democratic institutions, civic participation, human rights and freedoms, 
‘‘countering terrorism and cyber threats; advanced police training and support to key 
policing strategies; and support to the implementation of agreements stemming from the 
European Union-facilitated dialogue between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade.’’ 
 
4.3.3. SSR in Kosovo  
 
The fist SSR attempt began with the deployment of UNMIK under Resolution 
1244 which aimed to dissolve all institutions created during the uprisings against Serbia 
and to create new institutions under the supervision of UNMIK (Holley, 1999). 
‘Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation’ agreement was signed between 
KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and NATO was signed on 20 June 1999 after the 
elections internationally supported and mandated and ended up with the elections of 
Kosovar Leaders. In the agreement of Demilitarization and Transformation, the status 
of Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Police were accurate and were launched in the 
aftermath of the agreement in January 2000 (Sahin, 2016: 13).  In contrast, the creation 
of Kosovo Army was ‘due consideration’ ‘‘[on] the lines of the US National Guard in 
due course as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, 
taking into account the Rambouillet Accord’’ (Undertaking of Demilitarization and 
Transformation Agreement, 1999, Article 25, b).  
 
Following the agreement, Police Service in Kosovo was held under the area of 
rule of law along with the establishment of the Kosovo Judicial Institute, the Kosovo 
Law Center and the Criminal Defence Resource Center with the facilitation of OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo (Bernabeu, 2007: 75).  Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was 
designed as a ‘civilian emergency service’ to undertake humanitarian aid in times of 
disaster and to ‘contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities’ without any 
role in law enforcement (UNMIK Regulation, 1999, No:8, Articles 1-2). In addition to 
the law enforcement states, The KPC was not to be engaged with any political affairs 
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alike (Regulation No:8, Articles 2.3- 2.4). KPC was to constitute 3000 active personnel 
at most and 2000 at most to be called upon (Regulation No:8, Article 2.1). In January 
2000, the KPC constituted 5052 personnel with 500 reservations for minorities. 
According to International Organization for Migration Records (2000), 20,000 former 
KLA members applied to be enrolled in the KPC and 46 key leaders became part of the 
Corps (UNMIK, 2002).  
 
The Kosovo Police Service, as another security institution in addition to Kosovo 
Security Forces, was created under the mandate of UNMIK in the absence of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs. The KSP was composed of 5000-7000 police officers that 
would be educated by the OSCE. Approximately 4000 police graduated from capacity 
building education in 2001.The reserved quotas for inclusion of ethnic minorities and 
women (15 percent for each) were fulfilled in contrast to KPC which was dominated by 
former KLA members (O’Neil, 2011: 112). Creation of Police Service in Kosovo was 
held under the area of rule of law along with the establishment of the Kosovo Judicial 
Institute, the Kosovo Law Center and the Criminal Defence Resource Center with the 
facilitation of OSCE Mission in Kosovo. (Bernabeu, 2007: 75). The Police Force in 
Kosovo is based on ethnic representation that would reflect the population according to 
2010 Law on Police. According to the latest data provided by Kosovo Police Press 
Office, 84.04 % of the Police Force is Albanian and 19.96 % are part of other ethnic 
groups constituted by Serbs, Turk, Boshnak, Rom, Malazians, Croatians, Macedonians. 
85.93 % of the total number of 8855 people is male and 15.07 % is female.  
 
According to Sahin (2016: 14), Kosovo experienced a new phase with the 
‘‘adoption of ‘standards before status’’ between December 2003 and declaration of 
independence in February 2008. The standards were composed of democratic 
institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee return, economic development, 
property rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the structure of KPC (Standards for 
Kosovo, 2003). These eight standards were perceived by Albanians as a delaying 
mechanism to be recognized by the international community and led to another uprising 
in 2004 (Sahin, 2016). This uprising caused the death of 11 Albanians and eight Serbs; 
900 people wounded; displacement of 4500 people, and destruction of 700 properties 
and UNMIK equipment (International Crisis Group, 2004).  
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Martti Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland and the EU representative 
during the 1998-99 War and after the UN Special Envoy to Kosovo after the war 
presented a peace plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). The Ahtisaari Plan pointed to democratic 
institutions for the oversight of security sector and the place of rule of law, cooperation 
between Kosovo authorities and the branches of the UN, OSCE and the EU. Ahtisaari 
Plan also re-assumed the structure of Police Forces and proposed the creation of 
Security Council that would report to the Prime Minister (Ahtisaari, 2004, Annex VIII). 
However, the plan did not refer to the establishment of an Army. According to Sahin 
(2016: 15-16), the actions provisioned in the plan were to be taken based on the review 
conducted by the British Government’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team 
(SSDAT). This review suggested a ‘comprehensive and inclusive’ approach that would 
include local people and leaders and appraise international actors via the data gathered 
from the public (Cleland Welch in Ebnoether, Felberbauer and Stanicic, 2007). The 
review, according to Welch (2007: 48- 49) was based on two stages. First the report 
defined and analyzed threats; second The Advisory Team proposed creation of 
institutions based on Copenhagen Criteria which was demanded by the Javier Solana, 
the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy back then. 
This emphasis on creation of institutions according to Copenhagen Criteria was due to 
the prediction that Kosovo would be member of the EU in the future, so the institutions 
would be underpinning of the EU criteria. The review also proposed composition of a 
Steering Committee including representatives of UNMIK, the PISG, the OSCE, 
religious and community leaders, political parties, which was criticized by some Serbs 
and Kosovars (Welch, 2014). For Serbs, the Steering Committee was dominated by the 
Albanians, and for some Albanians, the composition of the Steering Committee was 
favoring Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Party.  
 
Ahtisaari Plan was brought in the form of the constitution in June 2008 
following the independence declaration in February 2008. In this amendment, Kosovo 
Protection Corps transformed into Kosovo Security Forces which was lightly armed in 
order to fulfill civil protection and disaster response. It can be deployed for 
humanitarian operations, overseas peace operations and training and exercise programs 
(Law No. 04/L-177 on Overseas Deployment). Kosovo Government initiated to 
compose a Strategic Security Sector Review of Kosovo which was published in 2014, 
predicted to transform Kosovo Security Forces to Kosovo Army 
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4.3.4. Economic Outlook and Agriculture in Kosovo 
 
Kosovo is market economy which operates on principles of free trade principle 
(Dr. Musliu, Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary). As Graph 27 below shows, it is a 
slowly increasing economy with a decline in 2015 after the destruction in the 
infrastructural capacity and human capacity fled in times of war in 1998-1999 (IMF 
Report, 2001). According to Green Report of Ministry of Agriculture (2016), the share 
of commercial activity defines the economy of Kosovo although agriculture has a 
relatively higher share in the economy. Graph 28 below shows the net ODA received in 
Kosovo and it’ s percentage of GNI which indicated the tendency in decrease in the 
economy of Kosovo. According to the IMF 2001 Report, international donors mobilized 
this foreign aid to recover the agricultural sector, housing, utilities. According to the 
representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Kosovo 
receives foreign aid from European Commission, USAID, Swiss Cooperation Agency, 
GIZ, TİKA. The most competitive agricultural production in Kosovo, is according to 
the all participants of the interviews is raspberry.  
 
 
Graph 27: GDP per capita in Kosovo 
Source: World Bank Indicator 
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Graph 28: Net ODA Receieved in Kosovo 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
In addition to fluctuations in GDP, Kosovo has a continuous trade deficit (please 
see Graph 29) although the value of exported goods and services has an increasing 
trend, which was indicated as 6.4 %. According to the Representative from the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development, Kosovo is undergoing an economic reform 
program that would determine the most competitive sector to create more jobs and 
income to close the gap between export and import. According to the representative, 
agriculture is one of the most competitive sectors along with mining, energy, 
communication and services.  
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Graph 29: Balance of Payments in Kosovo. 
Source: Central Bank of Kosovo.  
 
       Table 1:  Consumption Trends- Survey Results of Household Budget 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: KAS  
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2009 1.911 6.847 1.161 
2010 1.937 7.110 1.226 
2011 1.928 7.010 1.210 
2012 2.292 7.657 1.380 
2013 2.382 7.625 1.402 
2014 2.471 7.611 1.386 
2015 2.461 3.503 1.432 
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Table 2: Farm Structure by Size and Number of Agricultural Households in 2014 
 
   Source: KAS 
 
 
Agro- industry in Kosovo, is another growing sector in terms of turnover and 
employed people in industries according to the representative from Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. He supported this argument by addressing the 
Food Industry and Agro-Business for 2011- 2015 (See the Table 3 below). This sector 
covers plant and animal production; hunting and related services; forestry and 
woodcutting; fishing and aquaculture; food processing, production of wood and wood  
and of cork products (except furniture), production of items from straw and plaiting 
materials; production of paper and paper products; production of non-metallic mineral 
products.  
 
 
 
 
Farm Size  Area 
(ha) 
Participation 
in (%) 
No. of 
Agricultural 
Economies 
Participation 
in (%) 
0 and less than 
0.5 
9,142 5.1 39,939 35.2 
0.5 to less than 1 16,703 9.3 24,562 21.6 
1 to less than 2 31,905 17.7 23,827 21.0 
2 to less than 5 55,257 30.6 18,726 16.5 
5 to less than 10 29,518 16.4 4,493 3.9 
10 to less than 20  15,755 8.7 1,203 1.0 
20 to less than 30 2,303 2.9 228 0.2 
30 and more 16,798 9.3 253 0.2 
Total 180,381 100 113,231 100 
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   Table 3: Food Industry and Agro-Business for 2011- 2015 
 
    Source: KAS, Department of Economic Statistics. 
 
 The trade deficit in general economic indicators is also reflected in agricultural 
products as the Graph 30 shows off.  
 
 
 
Graph 30: Export- Import in Agricultural Products, in 1000 Euros in Kosovo. 
Source: KAS 
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2011 275,851,580 6,046 1,742 
2012 285,389,767 6,778 1,819 
2013 290,518,661 7,130 1,896 
2014 312,188,431 8,004 2,055 
2015 323,370 8,790 2,130 
Total 1,487,318.55 36,748 9,642 
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 As it is seen in the Grapgh 30, export- import deficit in agriculture increased 
from 400.000 Euros to 600.000 in 2011 in the years that SSR became an important topic 
in peacebuilding/ statebuilding in Kosovo.  
 
4.3.5. Data Collection 
 
The main focus of this study is how Security Sector Reform affects agriculture 
in post-conflict countries with a specific focus on Kosovo. As stated before, some 
scholars assert that many international interventions are not suitable for local economic, 
political, social context (Visoka and Richmond, 2016). They also address asymmetric 
relations in the region between locals and internationals. The processes, through which 
such obstacles arise, however, has not been thoroughly explicated. Interviews with 
actors involved in the interaction between peacebuilding/state building and various 
sectors in the economy can shed a first light over such processes. 
 Accordingly, 16 face-to-face, in-depth and semi- structured interviews were 
conducted, including interviews with representatives from USAID, Kosovo Police, 
Kosovo Security Forces, Kosovo Center for Security Studies, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, Kosovo Statistics Agency, an academician and eight students 
from Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary at University of Prishtina, and finally, a 
judge from the Kosovo Constitutional Court. I tried to contact with some 
representatives from Ministry of Defense of Kosovo, EULEX, KFOR and OSCE but 
my requests for interviews were declined. EULEX directed to the public resources. 
Members of the Kosovo Parliament pointed out to their work-load, mostly due to an 
upcoming early- election on 11 June 201. This political agenda also reflected on the 
other interview arrangements with Ministry of Interior and OSCE. While OSCE 
approved to send written answers but after seeing the questions, they asserted that the 
scope of the study is not in their area of action. As Neumann (2014) suggests that the 
number of interviewee sample does not rely on representativeness but rather relevance, 
having at least one interviewee from each major institution involved in the process and 
some group of people who had been engaged with agriculture and security sector related 
jobs, is appropriate 
All interviews were conducted in the beginning of June 2017, at the time and 
place that the participant preferred. In order to provide maximum comfortable setting 
for the interview, the questions were sent before the meetings since many of the 
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questions require technical knowledge. Snow-ball sampling was preferred to reach the 
students rather than random sampling which is preferred when getting in contact with 
and reaching to interviewee are hard (Neumann, 2006). The interviews with state 
institutions; the Constitutional Court, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
and Kosovo Statistics Agency were arranged via the Embassy of Turkish Republic in 
Kosovo. In contrast other meetings were arranged by the individual attempts of the 
writer. 
In a qualitative study, interviews are mostly used methods in data collection as 
they pave the way to construct a dialogue in critical points that can arise through the 
process (Smith & Osborn, 2007). Semi-structured interviews, in parallel, makes the 
investigator to scrutinize the participants’ perspectives and views deeply as semi- 
structured interviews are flexible in terms of time and the type of questions (Kvale, 
2008). Thus, when composing the questions, it was aimed to guide the participant to 
construct an open dialogue on the subject. Departing from Neuman’ s suggestions 
(2014), the questions were composed as descriptive, critical, by using reframing and re-
asking based on different data,  and sensitive to the issues. Additionally, they are 
recorded in order to re-listen and for transcription after the interview and all gestures, 
pauses and non-verbal cues are noted for analysis. The questions are constructed after 
reading secondary resources such as articles, reports, news in the media (Turkish, 
English and rarely French). This brings another complementary aspect of data collection 
as well. Plus, by reading the secondary resources before the interviews, the risk to 
extend the interview to the unrelated topics was also eliminated thanks to empirical 
knowledge that brought the interviwee back to the topic. During the interviews, all the 
participants were informed about the aim of the study, the investigator and the Ethical 
Form obtained from the Ethical Committee of Sabancı University presented into the 
consideration of the participant. All participants signed the consent form before the 
interviews begun with regard to ethical considerations. All interviews were recorded 
except the ones at the Kosovo Police and at the Statistics Agency upon the participants’ 
request. All the participants informed that they would skip the questions or withdraw 
from the interview but none withdrew from the interview. 
Just as many other field studies, this study has some limitations, as well. First, 
snowball sampling can generally have some drawbacks such as limiting the people 
interviewed in a specific group, however, as the subject of the study is limited in 
security sector and agriculture and as participants are composed of different segments, 
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this kind of sampling does not pose an unanswerable question regarding the sampling 
and capturing different perspectives in all participants’ answers for major questions also 
increases the reliability of the sample and the design of the study. This kind of sampling 
is also appropriate when dealing with a small size of sample as random sampling would 
lead to biased observations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). 
Language limitation should also be mentioned in this part as only English can be 
used in the interviews rather than native language of the participant. This is why no 
interview was conducted with farmers but with students of course of Agricultural 
Economy at the University of Prishtina. The students come from different parts of 
Kosovo, 3 from rural and 5 from urban cities and 5 were men while 3 were women. 
Thus, gender bias was weakened by this way. In the interviews at the University, a 
student translated 5 questions in Albanian language to other students as some of them 
raise the problem that they did not understand the English version of the questions. In 
addition, as all the reports are available in English and most of the participants can 
speak English this does not reveal a crucial drawback to the study.  
 
4.3.6. Qualitative Data and Hypotheses Analysis 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
SSR àIncrease in State CapacityàIncreasing Control over and Continuation of 
Agricultural Plan àMore Agricultural Production 
 
All the participants supported the idea that Kosovo state capacity is gradually 
increasing especially after the independence declaration and formal end of International 
Steering Group in 2012. The general tendency for this approach can be summarized by 
the words of the judge at Constitutional Court. For the UN presence, the judge said that  
 
‘‘There is still UN presence but many of their competences transformed to the 
Kosovo institutions … their role in Kosovo is now different than before… they are now 
not visible, they only visible, we see them only when they make reports in every three 
months to the Security Council. They are more active in North Kosovo but they do not 
exercise executive power in Kosovo.’’ 
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He asserted that ‘‘every institution was created from zero… while there were total 
destruction, mass graves and more than 1 million people returned after Serbian 
displacement.’’ The judge and the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development confirmed the presence of other international representatives at the 
state institutions of Kosovo to endure some cases or projects just as other Kosovar 
officers while asserting the increase in Kosovo state capacity.  
 The participants also agreed on the role of Security Forces in increasing state 
capacity. However, for them, as the state has not total control over agriculture as 
Kosovo exemplifies a free market economy, increasing state capacity has no direct 
effect on agriculture. For instance, according to the representative from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the government has agricultural development 
programs that can refine agricultural sector, the professor from the Faculty of 
Agriculture and Veterinary this does not prevail the ‘‘state capacity over the sector.’’ 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
SSR: Demining and More Secure Environment in Rural Areas à Return to 
Rural Arasà More Agricultural Engagement 
 
 Although participants were not crystal clear regarding the relation between SSR 
and agriculture when the research title was revealed, they were able to resonate this 
hypothesis. The most direct relation with SSR and agriculture for them was that the 
more Security Sector prevail secure environment, the more people can engage in 
agricultural activities. In addition to this sense of security Representative from the 
Kosovo Security Forces and from the Ministry of Agriculture put the role of security 
forces contributing to infrastructural development. Although students from Agricultural 
Economy and representative from USAID underlined the lack of infrastructure such as 
electricity, roads, and so on, they could not consider the security forces as contributor to 
the infrastructural development such as building bridges and roads. Demining issue, like 
in FARM Project, was also important in post- conflict Kosovo but the participants did 
not have a concrete data showing how much demined lands transformed to arable lands 
although they said in some villages it might be the case.  
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According to a soldier, Kosovo Security Force is present in rural and is able to reach 
all over the country in case of emergency. According to the Kosovo Police Press Office, 
 
 ‘‘Kosovo Police functions in two levels; central and local level. In central level based 
on a KP Structure there are General Director with his deputies, five Departments with 
their respective Directories and Divisions. In local level there are eight regional 
directorates with police station and substations in all territory of Republic of Kosovo.’’ 
 
Although the participants agree that rural areas are more secure than before and 
they mention individual cases for rural return thanks to more secure environment, the 
link between more secure environment and more agricultural product is not crystal 
clear.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
Resource Allocation and Political Preferences of Government in Favor of SSRàLack 
of Resources for Agricultureà Suffer in Agriculture 
 
 
All the participants confirmed that security sector and agriculture have slightly 
equal budget so it can be said that there is no resource competition between security 
sector and agriculture. However, representatives from two separate sectors pointed to a 
need to increase their sectoral budget as they lack equipment in order to fulfill their 
capacity. One different discourse was used by the representatives from civil society and 
aid organization that the budget can meet the needs of the sector if used and overseen 
effectively.  
 
Although the lack of interaction between security sector and agriculture was 
visible in the Strategic Security Sector Review (2014) in Kosovo that no article was 
about agriculture nor the Ministry of Agriculture was part of the consulting group, the 
question of ‘which one would you choose between SSR and agriculture?’ revealed the 
lack of dialogue between two sectors. Meaning, the students of agriculture said 
‘agriculture’ and the ones in security sector said ‘SSR’. Only the representative from 
 58 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the academician underlined the 
need for interaction for these two salient sectors that has not been undertaken so far. 
The both participant wished to be heard after this study by the others even though the 
both were not certain about the possible interaction between security and agriculture 
sectors except the hypothesis based on secure environment in rural areas.  
 
Hypothesis 4-5 
 
Employment opportunities prevailed by SSR and Job Attraction àMigration 
from Rural to Urban à Decrease in Agricultural Engagement  
 
 All the participants underlined the unemployment rate which is formally 
indicated around 30% of the population as an impediment in economy of Kosovo 
(please see Graph 31 for changing employment and unemployment rate). They further 
argued that people are not engaged in agriculture as the lands are small due to dividing 
lands after inheritance among the siblings. This division of land among siblings can 
prevail the importance of social organizational structure that family relations have an 
impact on agricultural activity. Additionally, all the participants presumed that people 
are coming to the urban arena from the rural in search for jobs in public sector, but not 
necessarily in security sector. A soldier and a student said that 
 ‘‘almost everyone in Kosovo seeks a table and a chair, wants to be a manager 
or director… We, Kosovars, want to order someone to do something but not to do 
something… And if you are a farmer, you should be always caring about your land, you 
have to be both producer and a businessman, but having a job from 8.00 am to 4-5 pm 
and getting your salary in the end of the month are much more preferable especially 
when you are not sure if you can sell your product such as maize and cereals if not 
raspberries in agriculture.’’  This can be seen in the Graph 32 that shows the 
percentage of people employed in agriculture.  
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Graph 31: Unemployment Rate in Kosovo. 
Source: KAS 
 
 
Graph 32:  People Employed in Agriculture.  
Source: KAS 
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we do not have the full data showing the applicants’ background for vacancies but for 
the first vacancies, we can say that yes, mostly farmers applied to the jobs at Police 
Forces as Kosovo was mostly agrarian society back then.’’  He added that 20 thousand 
people applied for the last vacancy in 2014 in total but provided no data for rural- urban 
division. Thus, this hypothesis lacks data in order to be totally approved.  
 
Hypothesis 6 
 
A. Conflictual issues between Locals and Internationals over SSRàCut in Foreign Aid à 
Deterioration of Agriculture  
 
B. Foreign Aidà Growth in Services Sectorà Crowding out Agricultural Production   
 
All the participants indicated that the amount of foreign aid to Kosovo has 
decreased over the years while acknowledging the importance of foreign aid in their 
economy. Plus, they valued the role of foreign aid delivered for equipment and capacity 
building training. Participants generally underlined the decline in need of Kosovo to 
explain the decrease in the amount of delivered foreign aid. The representative from the 
Kosovo Center for Security Studies came up with the European Economic Crisis since 
2011 as another explanation for decrease while the Judge brought international agenda 
by elaborating the changes of concentration of international actors across various crises.  
The status of Kosovo Army is still the main issue of the conflict between 
international and local actors. This is one of the obstacles that it was mentioned in the 
post- conflict context. In that case, it is visible that undetermined and delayed issues 
create future conflicts. Transformation of Kosovo Security Forces to a National Army 
exemplifies this situation as it is one of the main topics in current Kosovo politics. 
Although the participants mentioned the conflictual preferences over transforming 
Kosovo Security Forces into an Army, they did not mention it as a reason for decrease 
in foreign aid used as a ‘stick’ by the international actors over Kosovar government to 
change the ‘repertoire of action.’   
As second step to investigate the impact of foreign aid distribution between 
security sector and agriculture, participants were asked to compare and contrast the 
reserved resources for these two sectors. All said that the government does not receive 
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untied foreign aid but rather international actors have their pre-planned agenda with 
their executive personnel. According to the data Kosovo Government provides for all 
the foreign aid, 34 projects (with 2,077,120 total actual disbursement) were listed in 
contrast to 29 projects (with 329,0916,111 Euros total actual disbursement) in security 
sector. This non-presence of untied foreign aid eliminates the mandate of government to 
distribute foreign aid according to its political preferences. Plus, they assert that foreign 
aid has not crowd out agricultural production but privatization led to the 
industrialization of agricultural activity that boosted the product while people migrate 
from rural to urban areas.  
 
 Following these separate finding in accordance with the hypotheses, the 
interviews revealed that lack of data presents another impediment in post- conflict for a 
researcher. Finding data is hard due to lack of continuation of data in time series since 
independence, or lack of technological capacity to collect in agriculture as the 
representative from USAID argued. Thus, this qualitative research makes the need for 
further research clear. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
 This thesis emerged as an attempt to take attention to inter- sectoral 
studies in peacebuilding/ statebuilding activities in order to contribute to the mostly 
debated issues such as the discrepancies between international plans and local needs, 
legitimacy and ownership. This thesis prevails that although individual sectors attract 
attention, there is also need for communication among the sectors that would respond to 
the obstacles on the field. Moreover, this communication can compensate the 
discrepancies in the plan and implementation that would enhance local ownership and 
sustainability for the peacebuilding programs that pave the way for more legitimacy. 
Therefore, this approach can also contribute to the dialogue between academics and 
practitioners engaged in peacebuilding/ statebuilding area.  
 
The fieldwork in this research shows that, SSR can have positive impacts on 
agriculture by demining and providing security in rural areas. However, only this clue is 
not enough because in order to motivate agricultural engagement, change in mentality is 
required as many participants emphasized the overlooking the farmers and search for 
regular jobs in the cities. Plus, as some parts of negative impacts are accepted by the 
qualitative data, the need for separate studies is present to scrutinize resource allocation 
and the impact of foreign aid among the sectors. Moreover, this study can be extended 
by cross-country comparisons in order to test the hypotheses and to look for new 
explanations deriving from new empirical data.   
 
Based on the qualitative research, this study suggest inter-sectoral engagement is 
necessary to enhance the comprehensive approach in post- conflict. Plus, considering 
the local perceptions, as in the example of overlooking being farmer, would contribute 
to institutional reforms and capacity building activities in peacebuilding. Furthermore, 
this study also points to the requirement of policies that target migration to urban cities. 
 
In addition to the hypotheses examined in this thesis, field work and this attempt 
open new horizon for future research in post- conflict context. For instance, what is the 
role of rural- urban relationship in post- conflict recovery that shapes labor movement, 
production, industry and in more general, economic development. Second, as in the 
Kosovo case, how can we specify the role of Diaspora in this whole environment as the 
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qualitative data shows the resources transferred from Diaspora has an impact on 
economy via creation of new job venues in some sectors such as agriculture and service. 
Third, as the field research were conducted just before the election, the calm and non-
violent atmosphere in the capital city inspires the question what determines election 
violence in post- conflict countries as in some cases such as Central African Republic 
we observe election violence.  
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The Impact of Security Sector Reform on Agriculture in Post- Conflict Countries: 
The Case of Kosovo 
Interview Questions 
1. Could you tell me about state capacity of Kosovo? 
2.  How do you think state capacity has been since independence? Do you think it is 
 increasing or decreasing? A lot? Gradually? Very Slow?   
3. Is it about implementation or the program itself?   
4. Do you think that SSR increased the ability of the state to design, implement, monitor 
 and evaluate policy? By which means?   
5. Does the state coordinate/ organize/ control agriculture? What do you thing are the 
challenges for good agriculture policy? Do you think that SSR and increased state 
 capacity contributed to coordination, organization continuation of agriculture?   
6. Do you think that the state has full control over agricultural plans? Why? Why not?  
7. Do you have any statistical data showing the correlation between state capacity and 
 agriculture?   
8. Do you think there are drawbacks for agricultural sector? Can SSR pose any obstacles 
 for agriculture?   
9. Which one of them would you choose between SSR and Agriculture, if you had to 
 choose?   
10. Are Kosovar Security Forces engaged in rural areas? To What          Extent?   
11. Have previous conflict zones, the territories, where conflicts have been occurred, 
 transformed to arable lands? And if so, is there demand for these arable lands? Or 
 demands to make these conflict zones arable?  
12. Has rural population increased over years, or drastically following SSR? Are there  any 
villages that increased in population more than others? Why do you think this was  the 
case?   
13. Do you know people who are returning from cities to rural/ villages? Why do you 
 think they do/ don’t?  
14. How about the other way around? Are those who want to go to rural but not? Why not?   
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15. Why do you think there is an increase in or ‘return’ to rural is the trend? Is it because 
 of the possibility that people feel more secure after security forces are taking place in 
 rural? 
16. Has agricultural product increased following SSR? Which crops? Why do you think?   
17. Could you tell me about foreign aid flow in Kosovo?  
18. Does government receive untied foreign aid?  
19. Does the budget reserved for agriculture meet the need for agricultural capital- 
 intensive equipment like tractors, processing etc? 
20. Does the government reserve more resources in SSR than agriculture? Why do you 
think this is a good policy?   
21. Do international organizations deliver more aid to SSR than agriculture? What are the 
shares of these sectors in foreign aid distribution?   
22. Do people leave their lands non-harvested because they are not interested in agricultural 
activities? Are there cases where they want to harvest but cannot? If so, why?  
23. Are SSR related jobs more comfortable than being farmer? How exactly?   
24. Does working and life conditions of SSR related jobs attract people more than 
 agriculture related jobs? If so, do you think this had led to a labor movement to the 
 city?   
25. Do farmers apply for SSR related jobs than other people?   
26. Is being security-servant more prestigious than being a farmer in the eyes of  people?   
27. What would you say about employment and unemployment rates in Kosovo in post- 
 conflict era? How do you think it will extend into the future?   
28. Do people find more jobs in urban than rural areas?   
29. For what kind of jobs do people immigrate to cities? / What kind of jobs attract people 
 in urban setting?   
30. Does SSR provide job opportunities for people than other sectors for instance, 
 agriculture?   
31. What kind of jobs does SSR provide? Does SSR prevent important employment 
 opportunities?   
32. What is the employment rate SSR provides in comparison to other sectors? For 
instance, agriculture? Again to repeat, what are SSR’s advantages?  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33. What is the job opportunities / resource opportunities for SSR- related activities: civil 
society Project funding?   
34. Do you think that foreign aid has an impact on your economy. How? 
35. Have you ever faced with externalities / unintended effects caused by foreign aid?   
36. Do you know of people who could not get credit/ funding because businesses created by 
foreign aid IOs prevented them? 3. Has foreign aid caused to growth in any sector, 
specifically (for instance service sector)? Has agriculture been affected by any changes / 
growth of any other sector? How?  
37. Have there been any changes in foreign aid you receive following SSR: has the 
 amount of foreign aid increased or decreased: changes in tied and untied foreign aid, 
 as well. What would happen if foreign aid substantially decreased for next year?   
38. Have you ever experienced any different approaches to SSR, especially with IOs that 
 are active in Kosovo?   
39. Has the amount of foreign aid decreased following any conflictual issue about SSR?   
40. If yes, how did this decrease affected any sector specifically? (Security, agriculture?) 
 That happened to the ones who worked there?   
 
 
 






